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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(2):
PROBLEMS WITH THE EXCITED

UTTERANCE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON
HEARSAY
INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution1 grants all criminal defendants the constitutional
right to confront any witness who testifies against them at their
trial.2 This right preserves the sanctity of the trial because it
affords the defendant an opportunity to confront the testimony of
the witness and to ensure the veracity of the witness. There are
Sixth
that suspend the
certain exceptions, however,
3
Amendment's guarantee of the right to confront all witnesses.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), or the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule, allows distinct out-of-court
statements into evidence, thus permitting the declarant to
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury in the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Id.
2 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (stating that Confrontation Clause
guarantees defendant face-to-face meeting with all witnesses appearing before trier of
fact); see also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86
GEO. L.J. 1011, 1011 (1998) (interpreting rights Confrontation Clause grants citizens).
But see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 243 (1895)) (stating that Sixth Amendment must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and necessities of each case).
3 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (allowing hearsay statements into evidence against
defendant although declarant will not be present or testifying during trial); see also FED.
R. EVID. 801(c), advisory committee's note, (stating rationale behind excluding hearsay as
evidence is presence of four dangers associated with testimonial evidence- memory,
perception, sincerity, and ambiguity in narration). But see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65
(holding that Confrontation Clause demands showing that witness is and that challenged
statement bears adequate indicia of reliability before hearsay evidence is admissible
against criminal defendants).
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abstain from testifying and violating the defendant's right to
confrontation.4 This exception to the hearsay rule is an
established principle that is commonly accepted and utilized in
our court system.5 It should be noted, however, that critics take
every opportunity to attempt to limit its application or abolish
the rule completely. 6 Such critics are not without valid reasoning,
as the weaknesses of this rule are found not only in its present
day application, but trace back to its roots. 7 In addition to the
foundational weaknesses of the rule, its application throughout
the years has not been as consistent as its creators had hoped.8
This note will discuss the rationale that has allowed Federal
Rule 803(2) to overcome the long-standing principles of both
4 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (finding out-of-court statements admissible); U.S. Const.
amend. VI (stating defendant should be able to confront all, not some, witnesses before
him); James D. Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae
Reliability, 29 Loy. L. REV. 203, 246 (1995) (finding ease with which courts accept excited
utterance exception disturbing in light of Confrontation Clause).
5 See Eric T. Berkman, Are Excited UtterancesAbused in Criminal Cases? Defense
Lawyers Call For Limit On Evidence, MASS. LAW. WKLY., May 11, 1998, col. 2 (stating
that "it's just a plain old rule that you have to live with and when it comes up you have to
deal with it" (quoting J. Lawrence Rizman)).
6 See Id.; Aviva Orenstein, "My God!." A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 161 (1997). The author states:
The excited utterance exception has long been subjected to a psychological critique,
which questions the wisdom of a doctrine that relies on the stress of the declarant.
This criticism claims that stress and excitement are as likely to cloud perception and
memory as they are to ensure truthfulness [of the statement].
Id. at 161; Moorehead, supra note 4, at 203. The author sums up his feelings in
hypothetical questions and answers:
Would you entrust your life to the judgment or perception of a person who is acting
under extreme stress or trauma? Do you trust your own ability to reason and think
clearly under duress? Do you believe that a descriptive statement made at the precise
moment of observation is always reliable?... This Article argues that the answer to
each question should be 'no' and, therefore, that the res gestae exceptions should be
abolished.
Id. at 203.
7 See Defendants Trial Brief at 7, Commonwealth v. Gleizer (Mass. Dist. Ct) (No.
9609) (citing Thompson v. Trevanion, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1694)) (suggesting that even
Wigmore did not know whether to base rule on closeness in time or excitement).
8 See United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1017 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding out-of-court
statement admissible five to six hours after exciting event); State v. Dudley, 126 N.W.
812, 815 (1910) (finding out-of-court statement made day after exciting event admissible);
see also Leon Ruchelsman and Mark Kagan, Confusion Over Exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule, N.Y.L.J., April 30, 1998, at 1 (stating that "[a] careful reading of recent decisions of
the Court of Appeals as well as the Appellate Division, Second Department, reveal
uncertainty concerning the current state of evidence law and in particular the 'excited
utterance'... exception to the hearsay rule"). But see People v. Gray, 568 N.E. 2d 219, 226
(1991) (finding statement made "immediately after" exciting event to be inadmissible);
Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Fact That Rape Victim's Complaint or Statement Was Made
in Response to Questions as Affecting Res Gestae Character, 80 A.L.R. FED. 359, 362
(Supp. 1998) (stating that courts differ in their opinion of whether statements are
admissible when made after the declarant was questioned).
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hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, and the criticisms thereof.
Part I will analyze the basic premise of hearsay in general,
including its purposes, underlying principles, and its interaction
with Federal Rule 803(2). Part II will discuss the Confrontation
Clause, including its intended purpose, and how that purpose is
violated by Federal Rule 803(2). Part III will set forth the
present day standards for admitting evidence into testimony
through Federal Rule 803(2), including the statutory language
and additional elements created by years of judicial
interpretation. Part IV will study three major areas of criminal
law and will show how Federal Rule 803(2) has been erratically
applied. Part V will analyze Professor John Henry Wigmore's
theory on why Federal Rule 803(2) has a proper place as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Part V will also criticize Professor
Wigmore's theory through the use of modern psychological
studies. Part VI will study the unfairness of the current
standard of review for appellate courts when faced with an
appeal concerning Federal Rule 803(2) evidence. Finally, this
note will conclude by showing why the premise underlying
Federal Rule 803(2) is inherently incorrect, and has led us to
unpredictability in the courtroom, lack of uniform application,
and lack of fairness granted to defendants by the Constitution.
I. HEARSAY IN GENERAL
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement, used in court, to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. 9 Admission of hearsay is
governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1 0 which is complex
and multifaceted.
The hearsay rule functions to eliminate
testimony that is not credible, since the witness is testifying to a
statement that does not relate to his personal first hand
knowledge.11 The reason for the general inadmissibility of
9 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as a statement made by someone besides
the person testifying); see also United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D. Ky.
1980) (defining "statement" under FED. R. EVID. 801); Michael Fenner, Law Professor
Reveals Shocking Truth About Hearsay, 62 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1993) (defining
hearsay and enumerating its components).
10 See FED. R. EVID. 802. The Hearsay Rule states: "Hearsay is not admissible except
as provided by these rules or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
11 See Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719, 724 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (asserting probative
value of hearsay rests in credibility of witness as to hearsay statement, accuracy of his
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13
hearsay is threefold:12 it does not allow for cross-examination,
hearsay does not allow a jury to view the demeanor of the
declarant, 14 and the declarant of the hearsay statement has not
sworn to an oath prior to making the statement. 15
Despite the general rule that hearsay is not admissible, the
drafters of the Federal Rules, as well as many courts, have
adopted exceptions to this rule. 16 Exceptions to the hearsay rule
seemingly stem from the belief that a certain amount of hearsay
can be proven reliable.17 In formulating exceptions to the hearsay
rule, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence focused
centrally on trustworthiness.i8 Excited utterance, under Federal
Rule 803(2), is one such exception. 19 Excited utterances are
recollection of statement or alleged hearsay, and ability or opportunity to observe and
hear what was said of hearsay); see also CHRISTOPHER MULLER AND LAIRD KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 117-118 (1996) (enumerating "risks" of hearsay). See
generally Olin Wellborn III, Article VIII: Hearsay, 30 HOuS. L. REV. 897, 897-899 (1993)
(supporting idea that hearsay is subject to "hearsay dangers").
12 See generally Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal
Rules of Evidence with Supporting Commentary,171 F.R.D. 330, 547 (1997) (finding
problems inherent in hearsay); Wellborn, supra note 11, at 902 (discussing dangers of
hearsay).
13 See MULLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 117 (noting purpose of crossexamination is testing truth of witnesses testimony and allowing opposing side to bring
forth inaccuracies in witnesses testimony). See generally Wellborn, supra note 11, at 898899 (permitting cross-examination is one way to control evidence jury receives); Roger
Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 55 (1987)
(stating that cross-examining a witness is a fundamental right which helps ensure that
testimony is adequately tested to expose defects in the witnesses statement).
14 See MULLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 118 (stating that allowing jury to
see speaker as he is talking permits them to use instinct to determine whether he is being
truthful... demeanor refers to voice, intonation, facial expressions, and body language.);
Olin Wellborn III, 30 HOUS. L. REV. at 898-899 (allowing jury to be in physical presence of
witness).
15 See MULLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 118 (explaining sense of moral
and legal obligation which would prevent witness from fabricating any falsehoods after
taking oath); Wellborn, supra note 11, at 898-899 (noting value of having witnesses take
oath).
16 See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804; see also United States v. LeMere, 22 M.J. 61, 67 (U.S.
Mil. App. 1986) (stating that hearsay exceptions are to some extent based on necessity);
United States v. Muscato, 534 F.Supp. 969, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that truth is
more valuable than a correct application of the rule).
17 See United States v. Barbati, 284 F.Supp. 409, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that
courts are willing to characterize evidence as non-hearsay when evidence is highly
probative and necessary).
18 See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee note. The committee states that "tt]he
present rule proceeds upon the theory of that under the appropriate circumstances a
hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to
justify non-production of the person in the trial even though he may be available." Id.
19 See United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1969) (admitting excited
utterance statement made by police officer morning after being shot); People v. Brown, 70
N.Y.2d 513, 520 (1987) (allowing child's statements as excited utterances based upon
belief child lacked mental capacity to formulate lie); State of Hawaii v. Gonclaves, 5 Haw.
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believed to be inherently trustworthy because the declarant is
thought to be unable to fabricate a lie since he is speaking while
under the trauma of the event. 20 Excited utterances circumvent
the prohibition against hearsay, but must still overcome the
Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

II.

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

When applied in criminal cases, Federal Rule 803(2) testimony
is inadmissible on the grounds that it violates the Confrontation
Clause. 2 1 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which
encompasses the Confrontation Clause, states that all criminal
defendants have the right to face their accusers at trial and
confront them. 2 2 Furthermore, it has been held that the
Confrontation Clause is not a protection simply offered by federal
courts, but has been incorporated into the due process protection
afforded by state courts as well. 2 3
State and federal courts interpret this right to mean that the
accused generally has the right to view the witness while that
witness is in court testifying. 24 There is a bifurcated purpose for
App. 659, 666 (1985) (allowing excited utterance statement made by mentally
handicapped girl about being raped only after being questioned by her mother).
20 See People v. Brown, 70 N.Y.2d at 520 (allowing child's statements as excited
utterances based upon belief child lacked mental capacity to formulate lie); State of
Hawaii v. Gonclaves, 5 Haw. App. at 666 (allowing excited utterance statement made by
mentally handicapped girl about being raped only after being questioned by her mother).
21 See generally White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) (allowing excited utterance
by child to be entered into testimony despite Confrontation Clause); Webb v. Lane, 922
F.2d 390, 392-95 (7th Cir. 1991) (allowing victim's statement naming person who shot him
as excited utterance); Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1990)
(allowing witness to recant statement by defendant's brother made while defendant
committed offense regarding his brother's intentions); Stidum v. Trickey, 881 F.2d 582,
584-86 (8th Cir. 1989) (permitting gunshot victim's statement identifying attacker to be
entered under excited utterance exception to hearsay without violating Confrontation
Clause); Pulieo v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1206 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that excited utterance
does not conflict with Confrontation Clause).
22 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
23 See, e.g., Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (holding that
confrontation rights had been violated). See generally Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39, 46 (1987) (citing Sixth Amendment and holding that it is obligatory on States through
Fourteenth Amendment.); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744 (1987) (holding that
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were neither violated pursuant to sixth
amendment or due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment which applies it to states).
24 See generally Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (stating that face to face
confrontation reduces the risk that witness will implicate an innocent person); Kentucky
v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987) (holding that right to face your accuser is guaranteed
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having the witness appear in court. First, there is the belief that,
due to human nature, it is difficult to lie about someone while
they are present.2 5 Second, and perhaps more importantly,
appearance of the witness provides the accused an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness and highlight inaccuracies in the
witness' testimony, 2 6 ensuring that the witness' statements are
truthful.

27

It appears that the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause
serve the same purpose with regard to entering a witness'
statement into evidence. In reality, however, the two purposes
are quite different. The Confrontation Clause requires that a
witness be unavailable to testify before allowing their statement
into evidence, while hearsay does not necessitate that the
declarant be unavailable. 28 They are similar, however, in that if
in both federal and state court); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (recognizing
that long-standing tradition of literal right to confront witness at time of trial is furthered
by Confrontation Clause); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (stating that "[tihere
is something deep in the human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between
the accused and the accuser as essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution")
25 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1011, 1016 (1994) (holding that it is more difficult to lie
about a person to his face than behind his back); Nicholas J. Weilhammer, Face to Face:
The Crime Lab Exception of Rule 803(8) of the Montana Rules of Evidence and the
Montana Confrontation Clause, 60 MONT. L. REV. 167, 198 (1999) (stating that face-toface confrontation ensures witnesses who would lie are exposed); Elizabeth J.M. Strobel,
Play it Again, Counsel: The Admission of Videotaped Interviews in Prosecutions for
Criminal Sexual Assault of a Child, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 305, 307 (1999) (stating that
Supreme Court has held right to confront witnesses face-to-face is inherent because
witnesses may not feel comfortable changing facts before defendant).
26 See generally Henry v. Speckard, 22 F.3d 1209, 1217 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
Confrontation Clause mandates opportunity for cross-examination); United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 558 (1988) (stating that Confrontation Clause generally satisfied
when defense is given full and fair opportunity to probe and expose infirmities through
cross-examination); Delaware v. Fensterer, 475 U.S. 673, 686 (1985) (finding that
disallowing cross-examination prevents exploration of bias, thus violating Confrontation
Clause); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (stating that primary right secured
by Confrontation Clause is cross-examination)
27 See, e.g., Lee v. McCaughtry, 892 F.2d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that
Confrontation Clause affects the truth finding process of criminal justice system);
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990) (allowing child witness in child abuse case to
testify and be crossed-examined via live circuit television holding it would not impair
truth finding purpose of Confrontation Clause). See generally United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387, 389 (1986) (holding that purpose of Confrontation Clause is to ensure accuracy
of out-of-court statements; Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (stating that
Confrontation Clause's mission is to advance accuracy of truth-determining process in
criminal trials); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (stating that Confrontation
Clause's purpose is to ensure truthfulness of out-of-court statement for jury).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 484 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that
simply because out-of-court statement might be admissible as hearsay it does not
automatically come within Confrontation Clause); Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396, 1397
(9th Cir. 1985) (affirming ruling that permitted previously recorded statement from
witness who had died prior to the trial to be admitted into evidence); see also Sanson v.
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the witness cannot be produced at trial, courts may allow a prior
statement to be entered into evidence provided it is offered as
29
trustworthy.
More specifically, the Confrontation Clause calls for an "indicia
30
of reliability" to admit a witness' prior statement into evidence.
3
In other words, the statement needs to be proven trustworthy. 1
In certain instances, the courts have made it quite easy for this
For example, when a
"indicia of reliability" to be proven.
prosecutor attempts to enter into evidence a statement under one
of the enumerated hearsay exceptions, the "indicia of reliability"
is immediately satisfied. 32 Courts have also held that actually
qualifying for one of the hearsay exceptions further demonstrates
that the "indicia of reliability" has been met.3 3 The excited
utterance exception is one such hearsay exception where courts
admit testimony into evidence without a separate and distinct
showing of trustworthiness. 3 4 Courts base this on the belief that
certain hearsay exceptions are so firmly rooted within the
judicial system that there need not be a separate showing to
United States, 467 U.S. 1264, 1265 (1984) (holding that introduction of hearsay against
criminal defendants will not violate Confrontation Clause if prosecution demonstrates
unavailability of declarant); MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 63 (stating
that hearsay exceptions apply regardless of whether declarant is available as witness).
29 See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990) (holding that hearsay evidence
may meet Confrontation Clause even if it does not fall within hearsay exception by being
proven reliable); United States v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381, 383 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating
that Confrontation Clause is not absolute impediment to introduction of extra judicial
statements that may be introduced if necessary and reliable).
30 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814 (allowing witness's statement only if it bears
adequate 'indicia of reliability'); Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 140 (5th Cir. 1995)
(stating that Confrontation Clause requires showing witness is unavailable and
statement bears indicia of reliability to be admissible).
31 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814 (allowing witness's statement only if it bears
adequate 'indicia of reliability'); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that if
declarant is not available for cross-examination at trial, Confrontation Clause normally
requires actual showing of unavailability, as well as reliability of statement.); Sherman v.
Scott, 62 F.3d at 140 (stating that Confrontation Clause requires showing witness is
unavailable and statement bears indicia of reliability to be admissible).
32 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 815 (stating that reliability is inferred when
evidence falls within firmly rooted hearsay exception); Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 172 (1987) (holding that no independent inquiry into reliability necessary when
evidence falls within firmly rooted hearsay exception); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66
(holding that hearsay must have 'indicia of reliability' to be admitted without violating
Confrontation Clause).
33 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (finding that 'indicia of reliability' may be found
when hearsay falls within firmly-rooted exception to rule against hearsay).
34 See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 347 (1992) (stating that hearsay is firmly
rooted exception); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (stating that
spontaneous declarations is over two hundred years old, and therefore, firmly rooted).
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allow the statement into evidence, even in the face of the
Confrontation Clause. 35
III. PRESENT DAY STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EVIDENCE

THROUGH 803(2)

Although 803(2) creates an exception for statements relating to
an exciting event, made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement from that event, there areother elements which
must be satisfied before a court will allow an out-of-court
statementinto testimony. 36 These requirements form a threeprong test.3 7 We believe the most controversial prong is that the

declarant must remain in an excited state while making his
statement. The rationale underlying this prong of the test is
that, due to the excited state of mind of the declarant, he will not
fabricate a statement, and his declaration is therefore presumed
truthful. 38 As the court in People v. Edwards39 determined, the
purpose of this exception is to allow the statement under these
35 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (defining "excited utterance"; see also Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. at 806 (discussing firmly rooted hearsay exceptions); Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977,
978 (Utah 1993) (stating whether evidence meets the requirements of 803(2) is in 'sound
discretion' of court, and varies depending on particular issues in any given case).
36 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817 (1990) (concluding that firmly rooted
exceptions carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy reliability requirement posed by
Confrontation Clause); Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182 (holding that certain hearsay exceptions
are so "steeped in our jurisprudence" that they have become 'firmly rooted'); Sanson v.
United States, 467 U.S. 1264, 1265 (1984) (stating that reliability may be inferred in case
where evidence falls within firmly rooted hearsay exception); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at
66 (holding that independent inquiry into reliability is not necessary when evidence
comes within 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception because it is commonplace in our
jurisprudence).
37 See United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1017 (finding that three prong test
requires exciting event, declarant under stress from event when making utterance, and
utterance concerns exciting event.); see also Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116, 120 (7th Cir.
1985) (discussing similar test as found in United States v. Scarpa); Michelle H. Zehnder,
A Step Forward: Rule 803(25), A New Approach to Child Hearsay Statements, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 875, 905 (1994) (restating rule found in United States v. Scarpa).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that
excitement of event limits declarant's capacity to fabricate statement, thereby offering
guarantee of reliability); Atencio v. City of Albuquerque, 911 F. Supp. 1433, 1442 (D.N.M.
1995) (stating that excited utterance can only be made when declarant is under the stress
of the event because this prevents him from having the reflective ability to fabricate);
United States v. Reggio, 40 M.J. 694, 699 (N.-M.C.M.R. 1994) (stating that basis for
excited utterance exception is that declarant is less likely to fabricate statement when
laboring under stress and excitement of recent startling event or condition); People v.
Marks, 160 N.E.2d 26, 28 (N.Y. 1959) (stating that theory behind rule is spontaneity of
declarations of this type gives more assurance of veracity than with usual hearsay
declaration).
39 392 N.E. 2d 1229 (N.Y. 1979).

1999]

FEDERAL RULE OFEVIDENCE 803(2)

circumstances because the capacity for fabrication is no longer
present. 4 0 The other two prongs are much less controversial,
easily satisfied, and generally accepted by the courts: (1) an
exciting event and (2) the declarant's statement must relate to
the exciting event. 4 1
The 803(2) exception's greatest flaw inheres in the fact that
there is no objective method of determining how much time may
pass between the exciting event and the excited utterance. 4 2
Courts have, however, agreed that the excited statement does not
need to be made contemporaneously or even on the same day as
the exciting event. 4 3 This lack of objectivity leaves us with a rule
that is lacking in uniformity, full of unpredictable, and unfair.44

40 See People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d at 1231 (finding lack of motivation to fabricate
a lie).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Reggio, 40 M.J. at 700 (stating examples of excited
utterance); United States v. Ansley, 24 M.J. 926, 928 (A.C.M.R. 1987) (citing United
States v. Lemere, 22 M.J. 61, 67 (C.M.A. 1986) (stating subjectivity of determining
whether exciting event occurred); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 571-75 (7th Cir.
1986) (discussing admissibility under excited utterance exception).
42 See United States v. Grant, 38 M.J. 684, 691 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993) (stating statement
must be made contemporaneously with excitement of stress caused by event, and not
contemporaneously with event itself); see also United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048,
1054 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing time between event and utterance); Moorehead, supra
note 4, at 203 (stating historically, the justification of res gestae hearsay was that
exclamations spontaneously uttered during the excitement of a stressful event are made
without forethought and therefore trustworthy); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356
(1992) (discussing spontaneous declarations); United States v. Ironshell, 633 F.2d 77, 86
(8th Cir. 1980) (indicating statement must be spontaneous).
43 See e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d at 127 (stating excited utterance need not
be contemporaneous with startling event to be admissible under exception); United States
v. Moore, 791 F.2d at 572 (stating that excited statement must be made
contemporaneously with excitement resulting from event, not necessarily with event
itself); United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (involving twelve
hour delay between event and utterance); Guthrie v. United States, 207 F.2d 19, 22-23
(D.C. Cir. 1953) (involving eleven hour delay between event and utterance).
44 See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (declining to accept test guaranteeing
trustworthiness of Confrontation Clause); John G. Douglas, Beyond Admissibility: Real
Confrontation Virtual Cross-Examination and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 191, 206 (1999) (describing courts' application of hearsay as
unpredictable); Neal R. Ferguson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological
Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1997) (describing how emotion factors into whether
hearsay evidence is admitted); Glen Weissenberger, HearsayPuzzles: An Essay on Federal
Evidence Rule 803(3), 64 TEMP. L. REV. 145, 170 (1991) (stating that standard under
Federal Rules necessarily results in unpredictable application because very notion of
reliability possesses significant intuitive component).
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IV. AREAS OF CRIMINAL LAW

A. Child Abuse Cases
Federal Rule 803(2) is most effective when a child witness has
made the statement shortly after the abusive incident. This is
due to the emotional effect that such a situation has on a
declarant. 45 This does not necessarily mean, however, that
children are or should be treated differently from adults when
dealing with a potential statement's admissibility under 803(2).46
Irrespective of how children are compared to adults with regard
to 803(2) evidence, the rule is in a confused state, even to the
point of not knowing which standard to use when dealing with
out-of-court statements of children in cases of abuse. 4 7 According
to one author courts routinely use hearsay exceptions to allow in
out-of-court statements in child abuse cases even if the statement
48
does not exactly fall within an exception.
45 See Zehnder, supra note 37, at 905 (explaining effectiveness of 803(2) in regards to
children); see, e.g., Hon. Barbara Gilleran-Johnson, The Criminal Courtroom: Is it Child
Proof,26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 681, 701 (1995) (stating that child may be unavailable if event
is traumatic). But see Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that,
because they do not always understand nature of sexual contact by adults to be shocking,
children should be allowed some leeway in spontaneity requirement of 803(2)); Judy Yun,
A ComprehensiveApproach to Child HearsayStatements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1745, 1756 (1983) (stating major problem with 803(2) exception in regards to child
abuse cases is undue reliance on spontaneity, as indicator of trustworthiness, to exclusion
of equally valid indicia of reliability).
46 See e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 947, 947 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing criticism
some courts have received by placing undue emphasis on spontaneity requirement in
child sexual abuse cases); United Stated v. Lemere, 22 M.J. 61, 68 (C.M.A. 1986)
(rejecting argument that stress is often present for longer period in children than in
adults). But see Eleanor Swift, The HearsayRule at Work- Has it Been Abolished De Facto
by Judicial Decision?, 76 INN. L. REV. 473, 493 (1992) (stating that, when courts are
faced with child abuse cases where out-of-court statement was made by a child, courts
have responded by expanding exception granted by 803(2)).
47 See Krista MacNevin Jee, Hearsay Exceptions in Child Abuse Cases: Have the
Courts and Legislatures Really Considered the Child?, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 559, 567
(1998) (stating to ensure child's statement is reliable court should consider child's
nature); see also Jo Ellen S. McComb, Unavailabilityand admissibility:Are a child's outof-court statements about sexual abuse admissible if the child does not testify at trial?, 76
KY. L.J. 531, 556-57 (1988) (stating that relying solely upon time lapse between event and
spontaneity may limit excited utterance exception); Sheryl K. Peterson, Sexual Abuse of
Children- Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 813, 817-818 (1983)
(stating that courts often interpret available hearsay exceptions broadly in order to admit
evidence of sexual abuse in cases which do not fit within exceptions' technical
requirements).
48 See State v. Canida, 480 P.2d 800, 802 (Wash. 1971) (purporting reason and logic
demonstrate reliability of statement); Jee, supra note 47, at 559 (discussing different
hearsay rule for children).
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When considering the admissibility of statements made after
an exciting event has occurred, courts will generally use the
same criteria in analyzing a child's statement as they do when
considering an adult's statement. 49 The common criteria used by
courts, however, has resulted in anything but uniform
determinations concerning the admissibility of evidence under
803(2).50 Even more startling is the theory upon which the court
in United States v. Muirhead5l based its conclusion. The court
allowed a child's statement into evidence eight days after the
child had witnessed an exciting event: "[tjhe statement must be
spontaneous, excited or impulsive, rather than the product of
reflection and deliberation." (emphasis added).5 2 Many other
courts have based their decisions upon this theory, and the
results have been varied, adding more confusion to the rule as it
applies to children's out-of-court statements. 5 3 While many
courts have concurred with and utilized the theory as set forth in
49 See e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 806 (1990) (listing four factors which could
help trial courts determine admissibility of a child's out-of-court statements); see also
State v. Lonan, 459 N.W. 2d 656, 661 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033 (1991)
(relying upon spontaneity, lack of motive to fabricate, and reliability of witness among
other factors); Zehnder, supra note 37, at 902 (observing courts today recognize
traditional hearsay exceptions apply in child sexual abuse cases in same way that these
exceptions apply in any other case); Yun, supra note 45, at 1755-56 (stating that
children's statements should be analyzed differently from statements made by adults).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Muirhead, 48 M.J. 527, 532 (N.-M.C.M.R. 1998) (allowing
child's statement into evidence under 803(2) after eight days had passed since exciting
event); United States v. Knox, 46 M.J. 688, 695 (N.-M.C.M.R. 1997) (finding victim child's
statements to mother more than one year after abusive conduct allegedly occurred was
not admissible under 803(2)). But see Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 614 (9th
Cir. 1993) (determining admitted statements made by two year old, several hours after
exciting event, while should be inadmissible, was harmless error).
51 48 M.J. 527 (1988).
52 United States v. Muirhead, 48 M.J.527, 532 (1998), (citing United States v.
Ironshell, 633 F. 2d 77 at 86 (8th Cir. 1980)); see also, Jason H. Ehrlinspiel, Heflin v.
State- Admission of the Hearsay Statements of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Through
Manipulationof the Excited Utterance Exception: The Right Result, but the Wrong Means,
64 MISS. L.J. 801, 803-4 (1995) (discussing time lapse between statement and event);
Susan K Datesman, Survey of Developments in North CarolinaLaw, 1985: VII. Evidence:
State v. Smith- Facilitating the Admissibility of Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 64 N.C. L. REV., 1352, 1362 (1986) (stating that courts occasionally stretch
limits of hearsay exception to admit information).
53 See United States v. Merrill, 484 F.2d 168, 170-71 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1077 (1973) (finding out-of-court statement that occurred concurrently with exciting
event admissible); Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1057-58 (6th Cir. 1983) (analyzing
factors necessary for admission of excited utterance); United States v. Fountain, 449 F.2d
629, 631-32 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 929 (1972) (admitting statement of
victim made several hours after his vicious attack); see generally, Jean L. Kelly,
Legislative Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The Hearsay Exception and the
Videotape Deposition, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1021, 1035 (1985) (stating courts are
inconsistent in applying excited utterance exception).
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Muirhead, others continue to deny admission to out-of-court
statements, even when made in a time period much closer to the
exciting event. 54 In Territory of Guam v. Ignacio,55 the court
refused evidence of a two year old victim's statements only hours
after the exciting event had occurred.5 6 The court in both these
instances partially based their rationales on the spontaneity
requirement of 803(2), thus demonstrating the inconsistency in
the law with regard to out-of-court statements made by children,
and the potential for misapplication in future cases.5 7
B

Homicide Cases

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides an exception for
statements bearing upon an exciting event, if the declarant is the
victim of a homicide. This is so because there may be no
witnesses to the crime, except the defendant, who can testify to
the excited utterance made by the victim.5 8 Many times, in fact,
803(2) is not applicable in this area, because of the coverage and
scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 804, which allows statements

54 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 812-813 (1990) (denying admissibility 2-3 days
after exciting event); State v. Quinnild, 42 N.W.2d 409, 413-14 (Minn. 1950) (finding no
excited utterance in lapse of two hours); United States v. Fink, 32 M.J. 987, 991 (A.C.M.R.
1991) (holding that victim's out-of-court statements are inadmissible as excited utterance
even though event took place evening before and morning of report); Territory of Guam v.
Ignacio, 10 F.3d at 614. (denying admissibility after only several hours).
55 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993).
56 See Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d at 614 (stating reason for finding child's
statement inadmissible was because child victim was no longer in excited state at time
out-of-court statement was made); Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138, 139 (1945)
(holding that statement is inadmissible for lack of spontaneity). But see United States v.
Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that statements by three year old child
to mother hours after exciting event are admissible).
57 See Anna Frissell and James M. Vukelic, Application of the Hearsay Exceptions
and ConstitutionalAnalysis to the Admission of a Child's out-of-court Statement in the
Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse Cases in North Dakota, 66 N.D. L. REV. 599, 620-621
(1990) (finding use of excited utterance exception in child abuse case to be stretch); Myra
S. Raeder, Evidentiary Considerationsand the Rebirth of Confrontation Clause Analysis
in Child Abuse Cases, U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 80-81(1982) (discussing difficulty in strictly
applying spontaneity requirement).
58 See People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 523 (1969) (stating that hearsay statements
made by victim on the day of homicide are inadmissible); see also Bryan A. Liang,
Shortcuts to 'Truth" The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations,35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
229, 231 (1998) (arguing that courts do not rule on admissibility of dying declarations
with requisite careful reflection); Donna Merideth Matthews, Making the Crucial
Connection: A Proposed Threat HearsayException, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 117, 11819 (1997) (stating that, if threats occurred only in secret, listener may die and leaving no
witness).
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into testimony after the declarant has died.59 Determining which
hearsay exception applies is only the beginning of the court's
analysis, as courts struggle with competing social norms, lack of
uniform precedents, and want for a black letter rule to apply in
60
cases concerning statements of homicide victims.
Courts have generally held that the most important element in
determining the admissibility of out-of-court statements made,
when dealing with homicide cases, is time. 6 1 One should not
infer, however, that all courts have similar beliefs, or utilize the
same principles, in determining the duration of time which may
pass before an out-of-court statement becomes barred from
admissibility. 62 The advisory committee recognizes this
inconsistency, and even states in the notes to Federal Rule 803(2)
that there are no 'pat answers' to how much time may pass, and
that a 'slight lapse' is allowable. 63 In fact, many state and federal
59 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). This rule permits admission of dying declarations in "a
prosecution for homicide [when] ... a statement [was] made by a declarant while
believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he
believed to be his impending death." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); see also Matthews, supra
note 58, at 165 (stating courts "admit threat, fear, and abuse hearsay under patchwork of
exceptions, while they exclude vital portions of victim's words").
60 See Matthews, supra note 58, at 119. The author addresses this problem quite
clearly:
Often, the words the domestic homicide victim has spoke to others cannot be heard in
the trial of her accused murderer. Courts admit certain statements by victims when
they fit into existing categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule. However, when they
do admit threat hearsay, many courts appear to contort the rules in order to do so,
and which statements the find admissible varies state to state. (emphasis added)
Further, most threat hearsay comes in under the state-of-mind exception to the
hearsay rule, which does not admit the statements as substantive evidence and
subjects them to limiting instructions.
Id. at 119.
The author also stated that "[these cases] demonstrate the inconsistent manner in which
courts apply the excited utterance in domestic homicide cases." Id. at 140-41.
61 See Matthews, supra note 60, at 139 (stating that "courts hold that the time
between the stressful event and the declaration must be quite short, and that the
declarant still be under significant stress of the recent event when she makes the
statement"); see also Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Admissibility As Res Gestae, of
Accusatory Utterances Made by Homicide Victim Before Act, 74 A.L.R. FED. 963, 972
(Supp. 1998) (stating that as time increases between event and statement it is less likely
to be admitted). But see Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting
United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 85 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981)) ("The lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement,
although relevant, is not dispositive in the application of rule 803(2).")
62 See W.A.. Harrington, Annotation, Time Element as Affecting Admissibility of
Statements or Complaint Made by Victim of Sex Crime as Res Gestae, Spontaneous
Exclamation, or Excited Utterance, 89 A.L.R. FED. 102 (Supp. 1998) (stating that courts
must generally look to factual situation presented); see also Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 85-86
(stating that time element is not dispositive).
63 See FED. R. EVID. 803, advisory committee's note (stating that only a momentary
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court determinations of out-of-court statements in homicide cases
have been just as erratic, unpredictable, and dangerous for
64
defendants as they have been in child abuse cases.
The criminal justice system has been anything but consistent
in ruling on the admissibility of excited utterance evidence, as
their rulings, theories, and ideas about spontaneity vary on a
case by case basis. 65 In State v. Anderson66 and Commonwealth v.
Burke,67 the courts encountered statements made approximately
thirty minutes after the exciting event, and both courts admitted
their respective statements into evidence under Federal Rule

70
803(2).68 In State v. Ellis6 9 and United States v. Velentas,

however, the victims' statements were made only minutes after
the respective exciting events, and both courts denied admission
of the statements into evidence under 803(2).71 It appears after a
review of these cases that the courts are in an unpredictable
posture concerning out-of-court statements made by the victims
of homicides. 7 2 It follows that while the courts have determined
lapse is allowable, otherwise precise contemporaneity is necessary); see also M.C. Slough,
Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IOWA L. REV. 224, 243 (1961) (commenting
on how long excitement may prevail); Richard Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility
and Hearsay, 96 YALE L. J. 667, 700 (1987) (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory
committee notes).
64 See United States v. Velentzas, 1993 WL 37339, *4 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying
admissibility of statement made only minutes after victim shot); State v. Ellis, 297 A-2d
91, 94 (Me. 1972) (denying admissibility of statement made only minutes after threats on
victims life were made and minutes before threats were actually carried out). But see
State v. Anderson, 732 P.2d 464, 468 (Wash. App. 1986) (admitting statement made 30
minutes after exciting event); State v. Woodward, 908 P.2d 231, 239 (N.M. 1995)
(admitting victims statements made to her therapist approximately ten years prior to
homicide should have been inadmissible, but was held harmless to admit).
65 See Jason H. Ehrlinspiel, Heflin v. State- Admission of the Hearsay Statements of
Child Sexual Abuse Victims Through Manipulation of the Excited Utterance Exception:
The Right Result, but the Wrong Means, 64 MiSs. L.J. 801, 811 (1995) (stating courts need
more direct approach).
66 723 P.2d 464 (Wash. App. 1986).
67 159 N.E.2d 856 (Mass. 1959).
68 See Anderson, 723 P.2d at 468 (admitting testimony because victim was still upset
when making statement to officer, and had no opportunity to deliberate); Commonwealth
v. Burke, 159 N.E.2d 856, 864 (Mass. 1959) (holding that victims statement made thirty
minutes after incident was admissible without giving a basis for its admissibility).
69 297 A.2d 91 (Me. 1972).
70 1993 WL 37339, *4 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
71 See Ellis, 297 A.2d at 94 (requiring that statement meet test of spontaneity);
Velentzas, 1993 WL 37339 at *5-6 (holding that statement was not admissible because
declarant might have lacked personal knowledge despite fact that all three requirements
for excited utterance were present).
72 Compare Burke, 159 N.E.2d at 864 (holding that statement "arrest him, arrest
him" made by deceased wife to approaching witness to be res gestae admissible) and State
v. Woodward, 908 P.2d 231, 239 (N.M. 1995) (holding declarant's out-of-court statements
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that the amount of time between the exciting event and the
excited statement is the most important element in determining
admissibility, courts continue to differ in their decisions
73
concerning admissibility from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
C. Rape Cases
In addition to problems concerning admissibility of out-of-court
statements with regard to homicide and child abuse victims,
there is just as much speculation concerning statements made by
victims of rape. An individual who has recently been raped is
subject to a wide array of emotions. 74 Psychologists have
identified Rape Trauma Syndrome, in which they have
determined that a rape victim is likely to be emotionless and
uncommunicative following the rape. 75 This withdrawal and lack
defendant wanted to kill her was admissible as excited utterance) with Ellis, 297 A..2d at
941 (holding that deceased person's statement, describing threat made by defendant to be
inadmissible) and Velentzas, 1993 WL 37339 at *4 (holding that statements made shortly
after incident admissible as excited utterance).
73 See Wade R. Habeeb, supra note 61, at 972 (stating that lapse of time between
utterance and event is of primary significance); see also Eric T. Berkman, Are 'Excited
Utterances' Abused in Criminal Cases? Defense Lawyers Call For Limit on Evidence,
MASS. LAW. WKLY., May 11, 1998, col. 2 (stating that out of court statements should be
made in the heat of the moment and not later to police officers); But see United States v.
Iron Shell, 633 F. 2d, 77 85 (8th Cir. 1980) (asserting that "the lapse of time between the
startling event and the out-of-court statement, although relevant is not dispositive in the
application of rule 803(2)"); United States v. Rivera, 43 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 85) (considering other factors, other than lapse of time, in
determining whether victim "was still under the stress or excitement of the rape when she
made the statement"); United States v. Moses, 15 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied,1994 U.S. Lexis *4567 (1994) (quoting Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 85-86) (considering
time lapse as well as seriousness of victim's wound); Morgan v. Foretich, 84 F.2d 941, 947
(1988) (enumerating several factors other than time lapse to be considered).
74 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 200 (stating rape victims may initially be hysterical
or subdued and later experience nightmares, phobias and sexual fears). See generally
Patricia A. Frazier and Eugene Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case Law
and Psychological Research, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 299-300 (1992) (stating that it
takes time before rape victims can verbalize what has occurred); Deborah A. Dwyer,
Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument for Limited Admissibility, 63
WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1988) (noting wide range of emotions experienced by rape
victims); Ann Wolbert Burgess and Linda Lytle Holstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981, 983 (1974) (stating immediately after rape, victim's reactions can
manifest humiliation, fear, embarrassment, self-blame, and fear of violence and death).
75 See Laura E. Boeshen, Bruce D. Sales, and Mary P. Koss, Rape Trauma Experts in
the Courtroom, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 414, 416-17 (1998) (describing original model
of rape trauma syndrome consisted of acute phase which occurs immediately after rape,
and later reorganizational phase with varied symtamology); Orenstein, supra note 6, at
199-200 (stating that since rape victim is usually numb and uncommunicative, she is
unlikely to make prompt outcry required by the excited utterance exception); see also Ann
Wolbert Burgess and Linda Lytle Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome: Toward Proper
Use in the Criminal Trial Context, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 227, 229 (1996) (stating that
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of immediate communication on behalf of the rape victim
contradicts the premise of making an immediate statement
which would fall within rule 803(2).76 In fact, it has been
discovered that a rape victim often tries to block the experience
from their memory, and it may take a significant amount of time
before the victim actually remembers the event as it actually
took place. 77 Therefore, a rape victim may be calm directly
following the incident and subsequently become agitated when
feeling safe. 78 It is when the victim feels safe that the victim will
be likely to report the details of the crime. 79 Some psychologists
feel that even with the time delay the declaration is
trustworthy.O
rape victim's responses may be calm and composed, and therefore, mask true feelings);
Jeffrey T. Waddle and Mark Parts, Rape Trauma Syndrome: Interest of the Victim and
Neutral Experts, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 399, 400 (1989) (stating that first phase of rape trauma
syndrome is known as acute phase which is marked by extreme fear, victim may not
express fear but mask observable reactions to appears calm).
76 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (admitting hearsay statements "relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition"); see also Orenstein, supra note 6, at 200 (stating that rape
survivors are often too traumatized by attack to provide information); Howard Egeth,
Emotion and the Eyewitness in Heart's Eye: Emotional Influences in Perception and
Attention, 249 (P.M. Neidenthall & S. Kitayama eds. 1994) (stating that traumatic events
become imprinted in memory after sufficient time passes); Christopher B. Muller, PostModern HearsayReform: The Importanceof Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 371 (1992)
(stating that excited utterance is admitted since it is thought stressed person cannot lie).
77 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 200 (stating that it takes time for rape survivor to
process memories); Laura Etlinger, Comment, Social Science Research in Domestic
Violence Law: A Proposal to Focus on Evidentiary Use, 58 A.L.B. L. REV. 1259, 1297
(1995) (noting legal significance of symptoms associated with rape trauma syndrome are
"[u]sed to help explain behavior that might otherwise appear inconsistent with having
been raped"); Nicole Rosenberg Economou, Defense Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome: Implications for the Stoic Victim, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1146 (1991)
(describing "long-term reorganization process" of rape victim during which victim may
experience sexual fears, phobias, and nightmares).
78 See State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 924 (Idaho 1986) (asserting facts about sexual
assault likely remain with victim due to fact that it is one of most distressing events
person can have, until victim feels comfortable to talk about it); see also Orenstein, supra
note 6, at 201 (stating rape survivor is more likely to be calm shortly after incident and is
more likely to delay reporting crime.); Economou, supra note 77, at 1145 (noting women
may possibly be calm following rape incident); Burgess and Holstrom, supra note 75, at
228 (defining rape trauma syndrome).
79 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 200 (stating that "only over time do most survivors
process memories, begin to overcome the psychic numbing, and start talking to friends
and counselors"); JOHN C. YUILLE AND PATRICIA T. TOLLESTRUP, A MODEL OF THE
DIVERSE EFFECT OF EMOTION OF EYEWITNESS MEMORY, IN THE HANDBOOK OF EMOTION
AND MEMORY: RESEARCH AND THEORY 209 (Suen-Ake Christianson ed. 1992) (citing
woman who recalled being raped after several months).
80 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 200-01(noting that excited utterance exception "has
the psychology backwards" because rape survivors often delay in reporting crime);
Barbara Duffy Stewart et al., The Aftermath of Rape: Profiles of Immediate and Delayed
Treatment Seekers, 175 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 90, 92 (1987) (noting that women
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Aside from these psychological dimensions, courts struggle
with several other factors when deciding whether to classify a
rape victim's statement as an excited utterance.8 1 While cases do
exist where the victim immediately tells the name of the
attacker, a majority of rape cases involve victims who are
questioned prior to making their declaration.8 2 According to the
rationale of rule 803(2), however, it should not matter whether a
declarant has responded to a question or made the statement
upon their own volition. While courts focus their rationale on
various factors, the essential inquiry is whether the declarant is
still under the influence of the event in determining if they have
3
the reflective capacity to fabricate a lie. 8
In People v. Taylor,S4 a sixteen year old girl was forced into the
defendant's car and raped. After this event, she was let out of
the car and walked to a fire station where she asked to use the
telephone to call her father. Upon her arrival at the fire station a
fireman repeatedly asked her if something was wrong because,
he claimed, that she appeared nervous. Subsequently, the girl
told the fireman that she had been raped. The court held this
declaration to be inadmissible due to a lack of spontaneity.
often delay in seeking treatment).
81 See United States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069, 1083 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
statement made by rape victim one hour after crime was inadmissible); Parker, 730 P.2d
at 924 (noting that rape victims often delay reporting event); State v. Martineau, 114
N.H. 552, 557 (1974) (questioning by officer not enough to take statement out of excited
utterance exception's grasp because her condition was sufficient to satisfy excited state
requirement); Baber v. United States, 324 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (declining to
decide whether twenty-five minute delay in reporting rape fell within excited utterance
exception).
82 See State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn. 1993) (stating excited utterance made as
result of questioning may still fall under hearsay exception); Sanders v. State, 586 So. 2d
792, 795-96 (Miss. 1991) (holding rape victim's statement admissible even though she was
questioned by police before making it); People v. Velasco, 575 N.E. 954, 959 (Ill. 1991)
(finding questioning does not destroy spontaneity of statement); State v. Whitney, 159
Ariz. 476, 483 (1989) (allowing statements as excited utterances even though in response
to questions); People v. Brown, 70 N.Y.2d 513, 521 (1987) (holding that responses to
formalized police questioning may constitute excited utterances).
83 See, e.g, United States v. Tocco, 135 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
courts must determine if reason to believe declarant based on situation exists); United
States v. Rivera, 43 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that courts look to whether
rape victim is under stress of event when applying excited utterance exception); United
States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1017 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring excited utterance declarant
be under influence of event when making statement); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116, 11920 (7th Cir. 1989) (admitting statement twelve hours after event because person was
under stress of event); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 85 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding
that lapse of time between startling event and out-of-court statement, while relevant, is
not dispositive in applying excited utterance exception).
84 268 N.E.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. Ill. 1971).
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Furthermore, the court reasoned that had the girl not been
questioned the statement would never have been made.S5 It
seems another court could very easily have determined that the
girl was still under the influence of the event since the fireman
reported that she appeared nervous and may simply have been
hesitant to confide in a stranger after having been raped.
Comparing these cases alongside Rape Trauma Syndrome it
seems to us that psychologists are correct in their view that rape
victims frequently allow time to pass before making a
declaration. One may decide that if such a time lapse is
preventing courts from allowing the statements to come into
evidence, then the present interpretation of the excited utterance
rule vastly limits the number of declarations that may be
properly admitted.

V. THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION To HEARSAY DOES NOT
HAVE A PROPER BASIS IN THE LAw
The foundation for the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule is based upon the idea that because the declarant
made the declaration so close in time to the exciting event, there
is no time for the declarant to fabricate a lie or forget what has
just occurred. 8 6 This stems from the former res gestae notion that
a verbal response can be considered part of the event which
causes it when made almost simultaneous to the event.8 7 Time is
of the essence. 88 Courts, however, have failed to focus on time
85 See People v. Taylor 268 N.E.2d 885, 868 (Ill. 1971) (finding questioning destroys
spontaneity of statement); People v. Damen, 193 N.E.2d 464, 471-72 (1963) (stating that
statement cannot come as result of questioning).
86 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 168 (noting that justification for excited utterance
exception is startling event negates reflection necessary to lie); Moorehead, supra note 4,
at 232 (noting that excited utterance exception is based on premise exciting nature of
event guarantees sincerity).
87 See Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1937) (stating that res gestae is
"[a]utomatic and undesigned incidents of the particular act in issue"); Orenstein, supra
note 6, at 168 (stating literal meaning of excited utterance of hearsay rule is "things done"
or "things happened"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990) (defining res
gestae to be "considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. In its operation it renders
acts or declarations which constitute a part of the things done and said admissible in
evidence, even though they would otherwise come within the rule excluding hearsay
evidence or self-serving declarations"); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 244, 268 (John William
Strong eds., 4th ed. 1992) (stating that courts in 1800's used res gestae to refer to
spontaneous statements that were accompanied by legally relevant acts).
88 See, e.g., McClory v. Schneider, 51 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (1959) (holding res gestae
credible when statement spontaneous and concurrent to event); Klein v. Montgomery
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when interpreting the excited utterance doctrine. Instead, courts
repeatedly hold that the focus should be on the declarant's
reflective capacity during the time between the exciting event
and the declaration relating to it.89 For instance, courts look to
see if the speaker has the reflective ability to fabricate a lie. 90
Courts reason that presumably if one is still agitated or nervous,
or has a strong emotional reaction after an event, that person is
not being influenced by any outside stimuli. 9 1 Therefore, most
courts focus little on the time that has actually passed between
the two events. Instead, they require a showing that the
declarant remained in an agitated state between the occurrence
and the statement.
Furthermore, some courts have held that once the emotion has
died a trigger can again elicit the previous emotion and at that
point a declaration would also be trustworthy.9 2 This is known as
"re-excitement." Our understanding of this court-made exception
is that since the declarant is again under the influence of the
event, the declarant is incapable of fabricating a lie.
In accepting the excited utterance rationale, which differs from
the former res gestae doctrine, courts have neglected to consider
Ward & Co., 263 Wisc. 317, 320 (1953) (stating that time is of essence of res gestae
doctrine); Carroll v. Guffey, 20 Ill. App.2d 470, 475-76, (1932) (stating res gestae is
admissible when simultaneous to event); see also Orenstein, supra note 6, at 169 (stating
that "because excited utterances are connected so closely in time to the event and the
excitement flows from the event, excited utterances were deemed part of the action and
hence admissible despite the hearsay rule"). But see Olison v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 86, 90
(1922) (claiming that time alone is not essence of res gestae doctrine).
89 See United States v. Tocco, 135 F.2d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that excited
utterance exception hinges on excitement of event limiting declarant's reflective capacity);
United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1017 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that length of time
between event and declaration is only one factor to take into consideration when
ascertaining whether declarant is under stress of event); United States v. Kearney, 720
F.2d 170, 171, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (admitting statement although there was twelve
hour delay).
90 See Tocco, 135 F.2d at 127 (finding importance of time); Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1017
(finding time to be but one factor of many); Kearney, 720 F.2d at 171 (showing
arbitrariness of time element).
91 See, e.g., Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 1991) (admitting excited
utterance made 1-2 hours after shooting when shock was renewed); Orenstein, supra note
6, at 159, 169 (stating that excited utterance exception allows for statements made under
influence of exciting event to be admitted for truth of matters they assert).
92 See Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1017 (admitting statement when declarant heard sister
scream and realized his assailant came to hospital six hours after attack); United States
v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316, 317-318 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding victim's statement to sister
admissible after sister showed victim newspaper containing picture of assailant seven
weeks after event); But see United States v. Knox, 46 M.J. 688, 695 (N.-M.C.C.A. 1997)
(holding that victim's statement to mother more than one year after any abusive conduct
was inadmissible).
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the true psychological effects that stress has on people. Instead,
seemingly without any form of investigation, courts and the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence accepted Professor John
Henry Wigmore's theory. 93 Wigmore examined res gestae and
molded it to invent the spontaneous declaration, now commonly
known as the excited utterance. 9 4 He reasoned that a startling
event has the ability to still one's reflective capacities thereby
allowing the statement to be truthful. 95 Wigmore also turned the
court's attention away from the time consideration because he
believed it was the declarant's stress that should be considered
and not the time lapse. 96
There have been opponents to Wigmore who have expressed
their distaste for Wigmore's excited utterance theory from its
inception. 97 Furthermore, much of the scientific knowledge on
which Wigmore based his legal theories has been discredited. 9 8
93 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 216 (John W. Strong eds., 4th 1992) (stating
rationale for exception and attributing much of theory behind exception to Wigmore).
94 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 169-170 ("In his multi-volume treatise on evidence,
Wigmore developed in intricate detail what he termed the 'spontaneous exclamation'
exception to hearsay, which we recognize today as the excited utterance exception"); see
also, Moorehead, supra note 4, at 232 (stating that exception may be traced directly to
Wigmore's beliefs).
95 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 169-170. The author purports how Professor
Wigmore explained his policy of the exception as follows:
This general principle is based on the experience that, under certain circumstances of
physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the
reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs
is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions
already produced by the external shock. The witness' state of nervous tension was of
utmost importance in Wigmore's analysis.
Id. at 169-170.
96 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 171. The author criticizes Professor Wigmore's
theory:
Wigmore postulated that precise contemporaneousness was not required to meet the
excited utterance exception and believed that the doctrine did not have a fixed time
limit between the startling event and the excited utterance. He disdained the timing
issue and decried the "lamentable waste of time" expended by various state and high
courts trying to pin down precise temporal limits for the doctrine's application. He
believed that duration of stress, rather than exact timing, played the dominant role
justifying this exception to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 171.
97 See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the
Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257, 260 (1989) (listing
situations when hearsay is excluded); Michael B. Shulman, No Hablo Ingles: Court
Interpretationas a Major Obstacle to Fairness for Non-English Speaking Defendants, 46
VAND. L. REV. 175, 189 (1993) (indicating when hearsay exception is allowed); Lawrence
H. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARv. L. REV. 957, 965 (1974) (stating event and
closeness in time to event has little to do with speaker's perception).
98 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1986) (forbidding preemptory jury
selection challenges based on race); Sheri L. Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the
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For example, his belief that race and national origin effect
truthfulness, or his belief that a woman's chastity and veracity
were connected have been discredited. 99 Considering that those
ideas have been discredited, his theory regarding the
spontaneous declaration, as well as its theoretical underpinnings,
should be re-examined.
The idea that stress stills the reflective capacities and enables
the declarant's statement to be truthful is also disputed by many
psychologists.l 0 0 Psychologists believe that Wigmore's theory is
counterintuitive and that high levels of stress can cause
confusion.101 Studies show that stress does increase an observer's
performance. 10 2 Specifically, once an extreme amount of stress is
03
applied, the observer is no longer able to function optimally.1
Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 328 (1996) (analyzing racial
stereotypes and how they violate the Equal Protection Clause). See generally Defendant's
Trial Brief at 9, Commonwealth v. Gleizer (Mass. Dist. Ct.) (No. 9609) (discrediting
Wigmore).
99 See Defendant's Trial Brief at 9-10, Commonwealth v. Gleizer (Mass. Dist. Ct.) (No.
9609) (noting Wigmore's theory was based upon misrepresentation of controlling cases
and overstatement, if not actual restatement, of common law and the role of the excited
utterance with the common law) see also Sakthi Murphy, Rejecting UnreasonableSexual
Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape Victim's Sexual History to Show the Defendant's
Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 550 (1991) (discussing use of sexual
history to discredit woman's veracity); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation:
Rape Cases in the Court Room, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61 n. 360 (1977) (discussing
problems with testifying victims).
100 See Robert F. Scherer and Philip M. Drumheller, Consistency in Cognitive
Appraisal of a Stressful Event over Time, 132 J. SOC. PSYCH. 553, 558 (1992) (stating that
person's recall of event is influenced by stress); Daniel Stewart, Perception, Memory, and
Hearsay, UTAH L. REV. 1, 28 (1970) (stating that excitement is not guarantee against
lying); Gordon Van Kessel, Symposium, Truth and its Rivals: Evidence Reform and the
Goals of Evidence Law, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 499 (1998) (stating that people are likely
to speak accurately under stress is not supported by empirical evidence or common sense).
101 See Robert J. Urasano and Carol S. Fullerton, Cognitive and BehavioralResponses
to Trauma, 20 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 1766, 1768 (1990) (finding that people will go to great
lengths in attempting to rationally explain trauma); see also Laurence Walker and John
Monehan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559,
579 (1987) (stating researchers conclude stress distorts recall); KENNETH A.
DEFFENBACHER, THE INFLUENCE OF AROUSAL ON RELIABILITY OF TESTIMONY IN
EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 235 (Sally M. Lloyd- Bostock & Brian R. Clifford ed.
1983) (stating that confusion is caused by stress).
102 See Julie M. Kosmond Murray, Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility: A call for
Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Sexual Abuse Trials,
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 477, 498 (1995) (indicating that research shows stress has adverse
effect on memory, contrary to popular belief); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and
Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 961, n.69 (1989) (finding
witness' memory being susceptible to distortion is well documented); Roger Park, A
Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 75 (1987) (positing that excited
utterances are less reliable than unexcited ones).
103 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosureand Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 961, n.69 (1989) (finding witness' memory being susceptible to
distortion is well documented); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS AND JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS
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Instead, the observer's perception and memory become
impaired.104 Needless to say that rape, homicide, and child abuse
cause an extreme amount of stress. Stress can elicit personal
feelings which can affect one's perception.10 5 Therefore, while a
declarant may honestly believe that he or she is telling the truth,
the statement may be marred and distorted due to the
declarant's confusion and perception.106
Additionally, Wigmore's theory lacks a basis for putting forth
107
any time period to determine how long it takes to invent a lie.
Once again there is want for a psychological foundation.
Psychologists feel that the statement would have to be spoken
0
simultaneously with the event to ensure against deception.
This lends support not to Wigmore's theory, but to the original
theory under res gestae.
Nonetheless, courts continue to
improperly use the excited utterance exception to hearsay
presented by Wigmore when determining whether to admit
statements.
As seen in the aforementioned cases this has
resulted in a wide array of conflicting holdings.

TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 47-51 (1987) (explaining psychological theory that states
that stress causes people to perform at optimum level, however, that if put under too
much stress, person becomes confused, disorganized, and has memory and perception
impairment).
104 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 178-79 (finding perception altered by exciting
event); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS AND JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 32 (1987) (noting exciting event may affect perception of event and memory).
105 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 178 (stating that distracting excitement itself may
be strong personal feelings evoked by startling event that affect memory and perception);
see also Sven-Ahe Christianson, Emotional Stress and Eye Witness Memory: A Critical
Review, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 284, 290-294 (1992) (stating witnesses will suppress
unpleasant memories as defensive mechanism); Elizabeth F. Loftus and James M. Doyle,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 32 (1987) (indicating personal disaster will
affect memory).
106 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 180-81 (stating that "the declarant's startled
utterances may be honest declarations of what they thought they saw, but the very stress
that makes them so honest can also interfere with their ability to perceive, transcribe and
remember events"); see also Edmund M. Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REV. 91, 98
(1937) (stating startling events effect persons ability of observation).
107 See Orenstein, supra note 6, at 178 (stating psychological research does not
backup Wigmore's Theory that person did not have time to think of lie); see also
Defendant's Trial Brief at 3, Commonwealth v. Gleizer (Mass. Dist. Ct.) (No. 9609)
(stating that psychological research "clearly contradicts the notion that a person would
not have time to think up a lie before making an excited utterance").
108 See H. BRU'IT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 71-76 (1931) (stating that hesitation of few
seconds could suffice to develop falsehood).
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VI. ARBITRARY DECISIONS: STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is well settled policy that the standard of review for courts at
the appellate level when determining questions of admitting
803(2) evidence is an abuse of discretion. 10 9 The theory behind
this court-made rule is that the trial judge is in the best position
to weigh competing factors and interests in determining the
admissibility of certain evidence.1 10 While true, this particular
standard of review does not have a proper place in this instance
because of the ultimate ramifications it will most likely have on
defendants. 1 1 Research has shown that it is a rare occurrence
when a trial courts admission of evidence will be overturned,
heavily tipping the scales in favor of prosecutors. 1 12 It has been
stated that one reason for Appellate Courts failure to reverse is

109 See United States v. Thomas, 149 F.3d 111, 119 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that
appellate review of District Court determinations of evidentiary measures on abuse of
discretion); United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1394 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that
review of District Court's decision to deny Mr. Trujillo's new trial motion would be under
abuse of discretion); Reliant Airlines Inc. v. Broome County, 122 F.3d 1057, 1057 (2d Cir.
1997) (stating that District Court did not abuse discretion admitting statements as
excited utterances).
110 See Reliant Airlines, 122 F.3d. at 1060 (citing United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d
993, 1015 (2d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that trial judge is in best position to weigh
competing interests in deciding whether to admit certain evidence); United States v.
Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 805 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that trial judge has broad
discretion and his decisions are sustained absent manifest error); see also United States v.
Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1232 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984)
(acknowledging 'long held view' that trial judge is in best position to weigh competing
interests in deciding whether to admit certain evidence).
111 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc.),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978) (stating that lower court's admission may be upheld if
they did not act "arbitrarily or irrationally" ); see also Eric T. Berkman, Are Excited
Utterances Abused In Criminal Cases? Defense Lawyers Call For Limit On Evidence,
MASS. LAW. WKLY., May 11, 1998, col.2 (recognizing difficulty of revising trial court's
decision to admit excited utterance); Myrna S. Raeder, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It
Been Abolished De Facto By Judicial Discretion?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 507, 518 (1992)
(stating that party convincing trial court to adopt its position has very little chance of
being overturned on appeal); David P. Leanord, Power and Responsibility in Evidence
Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937, 974 (1990) (stating that there are few appellate reversals on
basis of evidentiary error).
112 See Eleanor Swift, The HearsayRule At Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto By
Judicial Discretion?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473, 479-80 (1992) (finding that only eleven
percent of twenty-seven federal cases studied were found to have reversible errors).
Compare Orenstein, supra note 6, at 196 (claiming that criminal defendants are
disadvantaged with regard to marshaling evidence which favor prosecution) with Roger C.
Park, Hearsay, Dead or Alive?, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 647, 656 (1998) (indicating that courts
have ruled in favor of defendants even though prosecution had respectable hearsay
evidence).
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because they seem to have a harder time holding that trial judges
abused their discretion than holding that they made errors of
law. 1 1 3 It seems that this is as unfair as the arbitrary application
of the 803(2) exception itself. If Appellate Courts began to
specifically justify the reasons for their evidentiary decisions, a
logical progression would develop that would foster a greater
uniformity in the law.
CONCLUSION

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) is clearly a rule that needs to
be amended. The requirements of the rule are quite clear: an
exciting event, no time for reflection, and the statement to refer
to that event. The current predicament inheres in the 'no time
for reflection' element, as courts make arbitrary and
discretionary determinations which conflict with the judicial
tradition of continuity and predictability. Consequently, with
regard to homicide, rape, and child abuse cases, courts utilize
differing standards when applying the excited utterance
exception, thereby resulting in unpredictable decisions.
Additionally, the psychological underpinnings upon which the
courts rely so heavily have proven unsubstantiated. Stress does
not prevent fabrication or inaccuracies. Stress does, however,
lead to distortion, confusion, and misperception. These are the
factors that influence which statements courts allow in to
testimony as excited utterances. Federal Rule 803(2) is a legal
doctrine based upon a psychological theory, and modern
psychology has proven its core element to be a falsehood. In
order to ensure the veracity of our system of jurisprudence a
change is required.
Our proposed rule for the excited utterance exception to
hearsay is to revert to its original application under res gestae,
where time again is the essential ingredient. A much simpler
test is needed in order to properly apply the excited utterance
rule. Since the only out-of-court statements that can be said to
have been
made without reflection are those made
113 See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 403-04 (1990) (stating that
courts rarely overturn trial court's discretion on evidentiary matters); United States v.
Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 757 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that even if trial court errs allowing
testimony, error is harmless and sustainable absent abuse of discretion).
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simultaneously, those are the only statements which should be
admissible under 803(2). The hearsay exception that has been
carved out is "excited utterances," and the utterances which
courts allow in to evidence ought to remain just that-excited. In
addition, we suggest that there be no such phenomenon as "reexcitement," that is, falling back into an excited state, hours,
days, or weeks after the event. As many researchers have
concluded that this hearsay exception may not even have a place
in the law, we feel that the above limitations are more than fair.
Angela Conti & Brian Gitnik

